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YOURS, MINE, OURS? RENOVATING THE ANTIQUATED
APARTHEID IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY DIVISION IN
NATIVE AMERICAN DIVORCE
Vickie Enis*

I. Introduction
In an ideal world, one marries for love. In reality, however, marriage is
often inspired by other motivations. The attractive young woman marrying the
wealthy, established, older man is an image with which we are all too familiar.
But an image not typically evoked by the mention of the word "gold-digger"
is a non-Indian marrying an Indian to gain access to tribal assets. Perhaps this
is the result of generalizations. Because many tribal peoples live in absolute
poverty,' one may presume that tribal members generally lack sufficient assets
to tempt others. Reality is not so seamless, and the possibility that a nonIndian would marry an Indian for money is a very real one, particularly
considering the substantial communal assets that are distributed to members
per capita.2
Since at least the nineteenth century, the federal government has tried to
ensure that Native American tribal property stays with tribal members, even
after their marriages end.' This desire to maintain the tribal character of
property persists despite that, during periods in history, the federal government
encouraged Native Americans to assimilate into the dominant culture, with the
natural result that some intermarried with non-Indians.4 History also shows
that whites often tried to take the land of the Native Americans,' both

* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1404 (Nell Jessup Newton et al.
eds., LexisNexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN] (recognizing "the extreme poverty in Indian
country").
2. E.g., Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that "as
a member of the Mdewakanton Community, wife 'receives monthly per capita payments of
approximately $84,000.00"'). This comment will use the term "non-Indian" to refer to any
spouse of a tribal member who is not also a member of that specific tribe, and therefore is also
intended to include nonmember Indians.
3. 25 U.S.C. § 182 (2006). This statute was enacted in 1888.
4. See KATHERINE ELLINGHAUs, TAKING ASSIMILATION TO HEART: MARRIAGES OF WHITE
WOMEN AND INDIGENOUS MEN IN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA, 1887-1937, at ix
(2006).
5. STUART BANNER, How THE INDIANS LosT THEI LAND 257 (2005).
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purposefully and inadvertently. The General Allotment Act, which divided
Indian lands into plots of individual ownership much like the fee simple plots
owned by whites, made it easier for non-Indians to take Indian land.6 Later
policies tried to reverse the devastating effects of the General Allotment Act
by seeking to protect the holdings of the tribes and to keep the lands out of the
hands of non-Indians.7
Several statutes touch on the right to Indian property held in trust by the
United States.' One statute in particular expressly proclaims that the rights of
"Indian women" to tribal property remain at marriage, and that a "white man"
marrying an Indian woman receives no interest in her tribal property.9 But the
language of the statute fails fully to encompass the class of individuals eligible
to marry (and subsequently divorce) Native Americans with interests in tribal
property.
The various statutes address the "white men" prohibited from acquiring
rights in the tribal property of "Indian women."o They neglect to address the
tribal property rights of the male Native American, or, for that matter, of any
men other than whites that may marry an Indian woman with tribal property."
A later statute generally describes the jurisdiction of the various courts with
respect to tribal land,' 2 but fails to provide any real guidance for how to treat
the different facets of tribal property in specific circumstances, such as the
dissolution of a marriage.
This comment will discuss property division in tribal divorce - particularly
in state courts - involving interests in both real and personal tribal property by
one of the parties to the marriage. Part II first explains the jurisdictional
circumstances in which adjudication of tribal property may fall into the hands
of the state courts. It then overviews the current statutes and case law
governing property division in divorces between tribal members and non-

6. Id. For a general history and discussion of Indian land policy and its effects, see Judith
V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995); Katheleen R. Guzman, Give
or Take an Acre: PropertyNorms andthe IndianLand ConsolidationAct, 85 IowAL. REV. 595
(2000); Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of
Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1559 (2001).
7. See BANNER, supra note 5, at 288-89.
8. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 181-182; 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2006). The status as trust land
contemplates rigid restrictions on alienation. Underlying fee title is vested in the federal
government, "limiting tribal ownership to use and occupancy." Guzman, supra note 6, at 651.
9. 25 U.S.C. § 181.
10. See id §§ 181-182, 194.
11. See id.§§ 181-182, 194.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b).
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Indians. Part III discusses the multitudinous shortcomings of the applicable
statutes, in terms of both drafting and application by the courts. It examines
the courts' confusion surrounding the definition of "tribal property," the
narrow race and gender focus, and the split in authority among the states
concerning how to treat improvements made to the property with marital
effort. Part IV proposes that Congress write a new statute that fully
encompasses both genders of Native Americans with interests in tribal
property, as well as the rights of people of all races potentially marrying a
Native American with tribal property rights. It then outlines how state courts
should treat any tribal property that appears in a dissolution-of-marriage
action. Part IV then advocates for a specific definition for "tribal property" so
that courts will know the precise parameters of their jurisdiction, rather than
allowing state courts to fashion their own definitions. Last, Part IV drafts a
statute that encompasses all of the goals discussed, in hopes of prompting the
legislature to revisit its anachronistic statutes to provide clear guidelines for
the courts. With uniformity among the states in the law of tribal property
distribution in divorce, state court judges will be less likely to exceed the
bounds of their jurisdiction, reducing the adverse effects on the Native
Americans to whom the federal government owes a protective obligation. This
comment concludes in Part V.
II. Dissolution ofMarriageInvolving Native American Property
For most jurisdictional purposes, "Indian" usually indicates only that the
person is a member of a federally recognized tribe of Native Americans."
Being an "Indian" can avail a person to a different set of laws than those to
which non-Indians might be subject.14 But membership in a tribe can also
allow access to a number of benefits that are not available to the public at
large." For instance, Indians, through membership in a federally recognized
tribe, may have access to certain tax exemptions, employment advantages,
distributions from gaming or other economic endeavors, or may be "entitled
to inherit certain trust or restricted lands."' 6
Congress strives especially to protect Indian trust lands. After the General
Allotment Act, which "devastated Indian land wealth," tribes lost the majority
of their land holdings." The federal government has tried to erase some of the
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See COHEN, supra note 1, at 171-72.
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id.
Kathleen A. Ward, Before and After the White Man: Indian Women, Property,
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effects of the allotment era through various federal policies and programs."
Of the federal policies that extend privileges to Native Americans on account
of their Indian status, some arise in divorce proceedings and create problems
for courts trying to determine the distribution of tribal property among the
parties to the marriage.
A. State Authority Over Tribal Members in Divorce Proceedings
As with all cases, one of the first questions to answer in a divorce
proceeding is which court has jurisdiction to hear the dispute.19 Divorce cases
involving a Native American may fall solely within the jurisdiction of the state
or the tribe, or there may be concurrent jurisdiction between the two.2 0 The
problems that attend state courts adjudicating tribal property division in Native
American divorce cases thus will only arise in special circumstances.
Where both parties are Indian and are domiciled in Indian Country, the state
court does not retain jurisdiction over the divorce.2 1 The state court may,
however, have jurisdiction where the parties are domiciled outside Indian
Country, or where one party to the divorce is non-Indian.22 The domicile

Progress,and Power,6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 245, 264 (2007).
18. See Royster, supra note 6, at 5 ("At the repudiation of the allotment era, Congress
ended all further depredations on the tribal land base and provided mechanisms for the return
of unsold lands and the acquisition of 'new' additional lands. With the reversal of the
termination policy came the restoration acts, generally providing the restored tribes with some
land base."); Guzman, supra note 6, at 606 ("While remedial, the Indian Reorganization Act
did little to halt the steady spread of land base erosion, as it neither reversed existing allotments
by returning them to the tribe nor invalidated completed transactions to Anglo-American takers.
It additionally proved ineffectual against the fractionation of existing allotments; such efforts
were not undertaken until Congress passed the ill-fated ILCA a half-century later.").
19. Jeannette Cox, Removed Cases & UninvokedJurisdictionalGrounds, 86 N.C. L. REv.
937, 938 (2008). See generally Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian Country: The
ConfusingParametersofState, Federal,and TribalJurisdiction,38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 539
(1997).
20. WILLAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN ANUTSHELL 214 (5th ed. 2009).
21. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) ("There can be no doubt that to allow
the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over
Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves."); CANBY, JR., supra note 20, at 214.
22. CANBY, JR., supra note 20, at 214; see also United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503
F.2d 790, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975). A South Dakota court
recently held that a state court may not refuse to assume jurisdiction over divorce actions
between Indians and non-Indians where the non-Indian party files in state court prior to the
Indian party filing in tribal court. Langdeau v. Langdeau, 751 N.W.2d 722, 730-31 (S.D. 2008)
(stating that, because the non-Indian party's complaint was filed first in state court and "was
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requirements found in various state divorce statutes and in the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act may also affect jurisdiction in cases involving
Indian and non-Indian spouses.23
Jurisdictional problems with Indians arise because of the inherent
sovereignty of Native American tribes.24 But allowing a state court to dissolve
a marriage "between an Indian and a non-Indian does not [inherently] infringe
on the right of self-government of Indians residing on a reservation."25 The
converse is also true: those engaged in relations with Native Americans,
especially within Indian Country, can become subject to tribal court
jurisdiction despite that they are not tribal members. This exercise of tribal
court jurisdiction, like the exercise of state court jurisdiction upon the Indian,
does not amount to an equal protection violation on the non-Indian.26
Under the "divisible divorce" doctrine, a court may have jurisdiction to
dissolve the marriage, but not to divide the incidents of the marriage. The
jurisdiction for the two parts of the divorce may fall to separate courts. 27 A
state court typically retains the authority to dissolve a marriage where one
party is a resident of the state for the requisite time period.28 But if the
property to be divided lies outside the jurisdiction of the state court, it must
allow the second portion of the "divisible divorce" - dividing the incidents of
the marriage - to be adjudicated by a court with proper jurisdiction over that
part of the case.29
While determining jurisdiction for the divorce decree may be as simple as
looking to the residence of the parties and does not inherently infringe upon
tribal sovereignty,"o determining jurisdiction for property division can
implicate issues of tribal sovereignty and the "right of the Indians to govern
themselves."" Some courts choose to exercise jurisdiction over the second
part of a divorce based on the location of the "incidents" of the marriage.32
properly commenced, the circuit court may not refuse to hear the divorce proceeding").
23. See, e.g., 43 OKLA. STAT. § 102 (2002); UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 302
(amended 1973).
24. See 16B C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 1209 (2010).
25. 42 C.J.S. Indians § 153 (2010).
26. See 16B C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 1209 (2010).
27. Smith v. Smith, 459 N.W.2d 785, 787 (N.D. 1990) (quoting Hall v. Hall, 585 S.W.2d
384, 385 (Ky. 1979)).
28. Id. at 788; Byzewski v. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d 394, 397 (N.D. 1988); see also Kelly
v. Kelly, 759 N.W.2d 721, 723 (N.D. 2009).
29. Smith, 459 N.W.2d at 788.
30. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
31. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
32. Kelly, 759 N.W.2d at 726.
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But due to strict federal restrictions, state courts, on their own authority, lack
the necessary jurisdiction to divide Indian trust property held by the parties to
the marriage.33
Unless the state has specifically assumed jurisdiction over civil matters
under the authority of Public Law 280,34 tribal courts have the authority to
dissolve marriages among members, as well as to allocate property in that
divorce action. 35 Despite that issues of jurisdiction for divorces between an
Indian and a non-Indian are unsettled among the courts, state courts often
assume jurisdiction to dissolve such marriages." The state courts, however,
are restricted from dividing or forcing sale of property held in trust by the
federal government or property subject to restrictions due to its status as trust
land." Even Public Law 280 states are subject to the restrictions on trust
lands, and though they may automatically have jurisdiction to grant the
divorce," the property division within that divorce may become much more
complicated due to 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b), which prohibits state courts from
determining "the ownership or right to possession of [tribal] property."3
B. The Statutes thatApply to Native American PropertyDivision in State
Court
The federal government retains authority to adjudicate title to lands held in
trust for Native Americans.40 Even individual Native Americans do not have
the right to alienate tribal lands.4 1 The Secretary of the Interior must consent

33. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 1052 ("Involuntary transfers of trust or restricted
allotments by state or federal action are void, unless specifically authorized by federal law.").
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); COHEN, supranote 1, at 544-45 (citations omitted). Public
Law 280 allowed adopting states to assume civil and criminal adjudicatory jurisdiction over
Indian Country within their state. See id. at 544 (citations omitted). Not all states have adopted
Public Law 280. See id. (citations omitted). To correctly determine jurisdiction over a divorce
action, one of the first questions should always be whether the state has assumed jurisdiction
over Indian Country under Public Law 280.
35. 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indians § 115 (2010).
36. See CANBY, JR., supra note 20, at 214-15.
37. See Jacobs v. Jacobs, 405 N.W. 2d 668, 670 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
38. COHEN, supra note 1, at 559.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2006).
40. See CANBY, JR., supra note 20, at 430.
41. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 1036-37 ("A tribal member's interest in tribal property is
inchoate, unless federal or tribal law recognizes a more definite right. An individual has no
vested right in tribal land or other property, unless some designated interest has been set aside
for the individual.").
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to any transfer of Indian trust property to someone outside the tribe.42
The federal government attempted to provide clarity regarding the rights of
those marrying Native Americans through the statutes restricting non-Indians
from acquiring rights in tribal property through marriage.43 One statute
attempts to prevent non-Indians from receiving any tribal rights, privileges, or
property." But the statute, as currently written, is in dire need of revision due
to its antiquated language.45
There is also a more recent, as well as more generalized, statute that
expressly prohibits state courts from adjudicating "the ownership or right to
possession of [tribal] property or any interest therein."4 6 The newer statute,
however, only addresses trust property or other tribal property with federally
imposed restrictions. 47 Nowhere does it address the different forms that tribal
property may take.4 8 Furthermore, there is no statute that directly addresses
property division in a divorce where one party holds tribal property and the
other claims an interest therein.
C. Classificationof Propertyfor Purposes of EquitableDistribution
Jurisdictions differ in the systems they use to classify property at the time
of divorce. All states use some method of equitable distribution, allowing the
courts to exercise discretion in dividing the property, rather than making
distributional determinations solely based on the title of the property.49 A
small portion of states are referred to as "kitchen sink" states.o In kitchen sink
states, the courts "may divide all property owned by either spouse at divorce,
regardless of when or how it was acquired."" More frequently, however,
states use the "marital property" system, whereby the courts divide all

42. Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 609 (1970) ("The Indian's right to make inter
vivos dispositions is limited and requires approval of the Secretary.").
43. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 182 (2006).
44. Id. § 18 1.
45. Id. ("No white man, not otherwise a member of any tribe of Indians, who . .. marr[ies]
an Indian woman . . . shall by such marriage . . . acquire any right to any tribal property,

privilege, or interest whatever to which any member of such tribe is entitled.") (emphasis
added).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2006).
47. Id.
48. For a general discussion ofthe different forms that tribal property may take, see COHEN,
supra note 1, at 965-66.
49. J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY §
3.03[1] (2010).
50. Id. § 3.03[2].
51. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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"marital" property, but do not divide the "separate" property of each party to
the divorces 2 "Community property" states are similar to "marital property"
states in the overall division of assets, but differ in "the time at which the
In community property states, each spouse
marital interest attaches.""
receives "a present, vested, one-half interest during marriage in all community
property when it is acquired."54 Other jurisdictions have developed "hybrid"
systems, combining the "marital property system and [the] kitchen sink
system."55 Despite the varying classification-based permutations in the abovedescribed systems, the Uniform Marital Property Act illustrates that there may
be a strong presumption that property held jointly by the spouses is presumed
to be marital, rather than separate, property. 5 6
Once the court classifies the property, "[t]he fundamental principles of the
division stage are almost identical in all jurisdictions."" The courts need not
divide the property equally among the parties.5 They are left to their own
reasonable discretion, and the specific facts of the cases are extremely
important in determining whether a distribution is equitable.5 9 In determining
whether the division is equitable, the courts generally consider the relative
contributions of each party to the property and to the marriage, much like in
6
the "dissolution of a partnership."o
When a court classifies property as either marital or separate, it can take
several factors into consideration. 1 Separate property can be that which the
party owns prior to marriage and the increase in its value (provided that the
increase is not caused by a party to the marriage during the marriage), or it can
be property inherited by the individual or received as a gift to that party
individually. 62 Marital property is "typically defined to include all property
acquired by either party during the marriage without regard to title."6 It is

52. Id. § 3.03[3]. Separate property is usually that property acquired prior to the marriage
or "accumulated during marriage by one spouse by gift or inheritance." Id.
53. Id. § 3.03[5].
54. Id § 3.03[4].
55. Id.
56. UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 4(b) (1983).
57. BRETr R. TURNER, 2 EQUIT. DISTRIB. OF PROPERTY § 8:1 (3d ed. 2010), available at
Westlaw, EQDP § 8:1.
58. Id. ("[A]n equitable distribution need not necessarily be an equal one.").
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Stephanie Barkholz Casteel, Planning and Drafting PremaritalAgreements, SR042
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 531, 536 (2010).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 535.
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"the result of labor and investment during marriage."' Property that is clearly
separate, however, may become marital "either because of the management of
those assets by either spouse, thus causing the appreciation in those assets to
be attributable to the marital unit, or by the commingling of separate property
with marital property." 65 A court will try to divide the property between the
spouses in accordance with principles of fairness.' Courts "typically cannot
divide separate property in a divorce action," but courts often will take the
value and "extent of the separate property" into consideration when
determining what is an "equitable division of the marital property."67
The same principles of classification and division of property arise in state
court cases involving Native Americans and their property, because if they are
in the state court, they are subject to the state's laws." The question then
becomes what property of the Native American, acquired by inheritance or
birthright, qualifies as separate property and thus not subject to division by the
state court.
III.. The Problems in DraftingandApplication of the TribalDivorce
Statutes
In a typical dissolution-of-marriage case - one where the court need not
consider tribal property - the court has discretion when dividing the property
between the parties. 69 The "court determines the contents of the divisible
estate and values all of the parties' assets," and then determines how to
"allocate the divisible assets between the parties."o But in cases concerning
one or more tribal parties, the courts must take other factors into consideration,
most notably with respect to the division of tribal property. The complexity
of such division is exacerbated by anachronistic statutes. These statutes
engender a host of complications, in terms of both their drafting and
application.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 536.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See CANBY, JR., supra note 20,
TURNER,supra note 57, § 8:1.
Id.

at 214-16.
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A. Problems in Drafting
1. Gender Inequality
Congress passed 25 U.S.C. § 181 in 1888 to protect the property of the
native woman that marries outside her tribe." The statute was designed to
protect the property holdings of the Indians because the government
previously "did not recognize Indian women as property owners" - her
husband "could use ... or even dispose of her share of tribal property."72 That
Indian women were unable to maintain their property upon marriage to nonIndians "had a devastating effect. . . on tribal cultures,"" despite that, under
tribal law, Indian women were capable of owning property.74
The relevant statutes address the "Indian woman" and the "white man,""
while failing to address the rights of the Indian men and their spouses. One
court stated that this statute stands on "questionable" constitutional grounds
due to its obvious gender bias, but made no actual determinations as to its
constitutionality because the statute was "inapplicable to the case."" If courts
are to uphold the spirit of statutes, Congress should ensure that the statutes
encompass the rights of both genders. The current version of the law of tribal
property division upon divorce contains antiquated language that unfortunately
may cause courts to overlook its utility.
2. Racial Inequality
The title of one of the federal property statutes, "Rights of white men
marrying Indian women; tribal property,"" expressly contemplates a "white
man's" inability to take property from his Indian wife." By naming "white
men" rather than other, more inclusive language - such as no person "not
otherwise a member of any tribe of Indians"" - the title renders the statute
parochial and incomprehensive. Although there is language in the statute
addressing men "not otherwise [] member[s] of any tribe of Indians,"

71. 25 U.S.C. § 181 (2006).
72. Ward, supra note 17, at 265.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 257 ("Indian women ... held the property rights in the land and in their homes
under tribal custom.").

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

25 U.S.C. § 181.
Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 904 (Idaho 1982).
25 U.S.C. § 181.
Id.
Id.
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providing a fleeting notion that the statute in fact might not be quite so insular,
those "men" must nonetheless be "white" for the statute to apply.80
Another statute that may come into play in property disputes between an
Indian and a "white person" is 25 U.S.C. § 194, which places the burden of
proof in establishing title on the non-Indian.8' This statute similarly places an
unnecessary race-based constraint on the statute's application. In one case, a
man contested the constitutionality of the statute, but the court failed to rule
on the issue because the man had in fact satisfied its requirements. 8 2
Without clarity and more comprehensive language, such statutes will be
challenged ad nauseum by non-Indians wanting a share of their ex-spouse's
tribal property. The statutes' antiquated language, as well as the distraction of
the constitutional race- and gender-based challenges, may cause courts to
overlook the spirit of the law - protecting the assets of the Native American
in the marriage.
3. Accusations of Unconstitutionality
One perceived, but ultimately benign, problem in drafting must be
addressed - statutes favoring Indian rights are not unconstitutional violations
of the equal protection clause. Though the statutes directed toward protecting
the tribal property of the Native American may seem to have an
unconstitutional race-based bias against the rights of non-Indians, Supreme
Court cases focusing on similar wording in statutes discredit that theory.
83 the Court determined that the classification of
In Morton v. Mancari,
"Indian" was a "political" rather than a "racial" one.84 Accordingly, statutes
directed toward "Indians" need only satisfy the rational basis test and not the
strict scrutiny required for classification of a race-based suspect class." As in
cases such as Mancari, Congress seeks to protect the rights of Indians,
including land and property holdings, pursuant to its trust obligations." The

80. Id.
81. 25 U.S.C. § 194.
82. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 905 (Idaho 1982).
83. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
84. Id. at 554 n.24.
85. See CANBY, JR., supra note 20, at 373-77.
86. Janice Aitken, The Trust Doctrine in FederalIndianLaw: A Look at Its Development
and at How Its Analysis Under Social Contract Theory Might Expand Its Scope, 18 N. ILL. U.
L. REv. 115, 126 (1997) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 302 (1902))
("While we have recognized these tribes as dependent nations, the government has likewise
recognized its guardianship over the Indians and its obligations to protect them in their property
and personal rights.").

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011

672

AMERICAN INDIANLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 35

courts therefore should not find statutes unconstitutional based on perceived
inequality resulting from the statutory protection of Native Americans as a
political class that the federal government has expressly pledged to protect.
B. Problems in Application
State courts do not have the requisite jurisdiction to determine title to trust
lands." Despite this lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership rights to
tribal property, judges have found other ways to allocate the rights of former
spouses. 8 That a state court lacks jurisdiction to divide Indian trust property
thus does not mean that the courts will completely disregard it when allocating
property during a divorce."
The tribal property considered in property division may extend further than
the normally contemplated "Indian trust" lands. It may include tribal leases,
or even per-capita income distributions from tribal economic investments.90
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law defines "tribal property" as that "in
which an Indian tribe has a legally enforceable interest." 1 According to
Cohen, tribal property "must be distinguished ... from property of individual
Indians" held in fee simple, even if it happens to be located on the Indian
reservation. 92 Tribes collectively have held legally enforceable interests in
several forms of land tenure. 93 These interests include fee simple absolute,
All of these rights and
leases, easements, and even subsurface rights.
interests must be considered in divorce.
1. Courts Offsetting Tribal Property
State courts have acknowledged that they lack the authority to divide or
determine the title to Indian trust property in any proceeding, including a
divorce, due to federal restrictions.95 But many courts nonetheless are willing
87. Landauer v. Landauer, 975 P.2d 577, 580 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); see Ducheneaux v.
Sec'y of Interior, 837 F.2d 340, 342-43 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
88. E.g., Landauer, 975 P.2d at 579 (viewing the property as community property, rather
than the separate property of the individual, and thus dividing it between the spouses). That
there was a community property agreement executed between the parties to the marriage that
one party tried to use in the dissolution may have made the situation more confusing. See id.
at 582.
89. Id. at 582-83.
90. Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
91. COHEN, supra note 1, at 966.
92. See id
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. E.g., Foster v. Foster, 883 P.2d 397, 401 (Alaska 1994) (citing In re Marriage of
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to consider the value of that property to determine the economic standing of
each party to the divorce." Considering the value of the trust property in
determining the equitable distribution of the property is akin to considering the
value of separate property, and is thus ostensibly an erroneous application of
established principles of property division upon divorce.97 In relation to
considering the value of the trust property to determine economic standing,
some state courts require the tribal member to compensate the non-Indian with
non-tribal assets to offset the value of the tribal property."
Some states contend that where the non-Indian spouse somehow acquires
an interest in the tribal property due to improvements caused by marital
efforts, the tribal member spouse should award the non-Indian spouse
offsetting assets to compensate for the inability of the court to distribute the
tribal property." In one instance, a state court determined that a home built on
tribal land could be personal rather than real property."oo As a result, the court
considered the market value of the improvements in devising an equitable
distribution, as the improvements could not be severed absent tribal consent,
and therefore could not be given directly to the other spouse.'o
One method state courts have employed to limit protection of Native
American property is to assert that there is no federal preemption preventing
state courts from reimbursing non-Indian spouses with other property from the
marriage.'02 Granting the non-Indian spouse non-tribal property in lieu of the
tribal property is the court's way of trying to make an equitable division by
Wellman, 852 P.2d 559, 563 (Mont. 1993)).
96. See, e.g., id.
97. Trust property is derived from a membership/birthright, and not from any marital effort.
Separate property, such as a gift or inheritance, similarly involves no marital effort. Because
the value of separate property does not factor into equitable distribution and because trust
property is substantively analogous to separate property, the value of trust property similarly
should be excluded from such determinations.
98. E.g., Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 899-900 (Idaho 1982).
99. 1 JUDITH S. CRITTENDEN & CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, ALABAMA FAMILY LAW § 7:5
(2010), availableat Westlaw, ALPRAC-FAM § 7:5.
100. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 405 N.W.2d 668, 669 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
101. Id. The court determined that the location of the property in a divorce is irrelevant,
treating a divorce involving one tribal member the same as a divorce involving no tribal
members. Id. at 670. Although the court in this case did not limit its ruling that courts should
treat improvements as personal property to cases where both parties are Indians, one should not
that both parties were enrolled tribal members and that the tribe granted the land in question to
the wife for "use and occupancy." Id. at 669. The court may have decided that this
classification of improvements as personal property was fair because the property would stay
with a member of the tribe regardless of which party received it in the divorce.
102. See Fisher v. Fisher, 656 P.2d 129, 132 (Idaho 1982).
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considering the value of the property in its determination, despite that it lacked
the authority to make a distribution thereof.
Despite the abridgement of Indian property rights in some ways, courts may
protect them in others, such as by finding that clearly expressed intent to
convert tribal property into martial property through a legal document does not
affect the ownership of the land.'s The same courts, however, simultaneously
may functionally limit those property rights by considering the relative worth
of the property to determine the future income of the parties.'" Nevertheless,
when determining the value of the property in martial dissolution, the courts
must (despite that they often do not) consider the limitations that the federal
government places on the trust property's use and future alienation, making it
worth substantially less than comparable property without restrictions.0 o
Despite that such actions are prohibited by the antiquated tribal divorce
statutes, courts have fashioned -these elusive methods of property
classification, distribution, and valuation to circumvent the statutory
prohibitions against adjudicating tribal property and interests therein.
2. Division of the Propertyas if it DidNot Comefrom Tribal Sources
Courts do more than merely adjudicate interests with respect to tribal trust
property. For example, one court determined that where personal property is
purchased with tribal resources, the court may order a sale of the property and
a division of its proceeds.' 06 Restrictions on real property arise in state courts
where the tribal property is in trust or subject to restrictions on alienation by
the federal government.' 7 Personal property purchased with tribal resources,
however, does not carry the same explicit restrictions as trust property, and

103. Landauer v. Landauer, 975 P.2d 577, 580-81 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
104. Id. at 583.
105. Id. The transfer restrictions placed on trust land greatly reduce its worth. Courts that
consider trust land in property distribution but fail to consider these transfer restrictions in
valuation place a substantial burden on the tribal party. See Angelique EagleWoman, Tribal
Nations and Tribalist Economics: The Historical and Contemporary Impacts of
IntergenerationalMaterial Poverty and Cultural Wealth Within the United States, 49
WASHBURNL.J. 805, 8 19-20 (2010) ("Land as the basis of capital asset creation is of primary
importance to the foundation of economic prosperity in the nineteenth and twentieth century.
Trust land is inalienable and cannot be sold, taxed, mortgaged, or used for collateral. However,
trust-land restrictions effectively limit a tribe's revenue base and limit the ability for either a
tribe or an individual to utilize the primary asset - land and resources derived from the land.
These restrictions on federal trust land have had several negative economic impacts on Tribal
Nations and individual Native Americans.").
106. Fisher,656 P.2d at 131.
107. Id.
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courts therefore sometimes erroneously order the property sold or make
determinations of its ownership."os
One state court found that per-capita income awarded to tribal members
because of their tribal status is marital income if received during the pendency
of the marriage.o' Even a tribal code declaring per-capita payments the
separate property of a specific tribal member was insufficient to prevent the
court from declaring the payments as marital income and subsequently
dividing them between the former spouses." For the court, that the per-capita
funds distributed to the wife from the tribe were due to a birthright and not the
effort of either spouse during the marriage was irrelevant."'
Such outcomes are harmful because they remove tribal assets from tribal
members, and could potentially even compel non-Indians to marry Indians
solely for their per-capita distributions, which in some cases are
extraordinarily high in value." 2 Moreover, despite that the purpose in dividing
the per-capita payments is to effect an equitable distribution, their division
actually leads to an inequitabledistribution, affording assets to the non-Indian
partner that involve no marital effort.
3. Refusal to Adjudicate Any Portionof the Interest if it Is Tribal
Conversely, other states are less enthusiastic to make determinations
regarding the ownership of tribal property. Due to the inability of state courts
to adjudicate title to tribal lands held in trust by the federal government,' '1
courts conclude that they are similarly unable to determine rights related to any
tribal property.1' To these courts, even simple valuation of tribal property for
the purpose of determining the economic standing of the parties is outside their
jurisdiction." 5 The position in these jurisdictions doubtless better respects the
rights of tribal parties and the nature of trust property; the problem lies not in
the present outcome, but in the inconsistency among the courts occasioned by
the ambiguous and antiquated Indian divorce statutes.

108. Id.
109. Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
110. Id. at 369-70.
111. For an explanation of why this characterization is egregiously misguided, see supra
note 97 and accompanying text.
112. E.g., Zander, 720 N.W.2d at 369 (noting that "as a member of the Mdewakanton
Community, wife 'receives monthly per capita payments of approximately $84,000.00"').
113. See Ducheneaux v. Sec'y of Interior, 837 F.2d 340, 342-43 (8th Cir. 1988).
114. In re Marriage of Wellman, 852 P.2d 559, 563 (Mont. 1993).
115. Id.
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An advocate of this position, the Montana courts do not assume jurisdiction
to adjudicate trust property matters "in any way whatsoever."' 16 The Supreme
Court of Montana in one case even denied the district court's request for a
tribal property appraisal to determine its value for the purpose of making an
equitable distribution of the marital property.'17 If the only assets the parties
to the marriage have are tribal property, a state court in Montana may not have
jurisdiction to determine any property division."' Montana does not even
allow its courts to value leases of trust land held by one of the parties."'
Some courts thus conclude that the equitable way to handle the property of
the tribal member spouse is to completely disregard it, perhaps because it is
unfair to consider the value of relatively inalienable property when
determining distributions. This is a more favorable standpoint than other
courts have taken, and better reflects the idea that state courts should not be
able to adjudicate interests in Indian property. By completely disregarding the
value of improvements, trust land, leases, per-capita distributions, and other
property that derives from tribal assets, the courts recognize the "separate"
character of interests in tribal property that should be protected because of the
unique way in which they are acquired.
4. PublicLaw 280 States

Public Law 280120 may be the impetus for some of the differences between
the various state courts' treatment of jurisdiction over tribal property matters
in divorce. Through Public Law 280, Congress allowed state governments the
option to assume civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over tribes and their members,
and a few states in fact chose to assume such jurisdiction.121
Minnesota and Wisconsin, for example, assumed jurisdiction over civil
matters "between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the
areas of Indian country." 22 After assuming such jurisdiction, these courts
freely (though nonetheless erroneously)12 3 adjudicated tribal property matters
in divorce.124 Alternatively, Montana, a state that seems more reluctant to

116. E.g., Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 921 (Idaho 1982) (Bistline, J., dissenting).
117. Smith v. McKeon, 946 P.2d 117 (Mont. 1997).
118. E.g., id at 118.
119. E.g., In re Marriage of Baker, 234 P.3d 70, 75 (Mont. 2010). Despite that one party to
the marriage received benefits from the lease, she did not hold the underlying title. Id. at 76.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006).
121. Id.
122. Id. § 1360(a).
123. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
124. A Minnesota court divided per-capita distributions ofone spouse between both spouses
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adjudicate matters of tribal property,'2 did not assume jurisdiction for civil
causes of action in Indian Country through Public Law 280.126 Nevertheless,
there are outlier states, such as Washington, that did not adopt Public Law 280
but still treat tribal property in divorce similarly to those states that have
assumed jurisdiction over civil causes of action. 127
IV Suggested Approaches
A. TribalPropertyDefined
The title of 25 U.S.C. § 181, "Rights of white men marrying Indian women;
tribal property," prohibits the "white man" marrying the "Indian woman" from
acquiring any "tribal property, privilege, or interest." 28 Nowhere does it
define, however, what those interests might be. In the statute, Congress
addresses the treatment of tribal property, but fails fully to define "tribal
property" and its parameters. State courts therefore must blindly interpret
Congress's intent in statutes protecting "tribal property."
With little direction, courts have determined that tribal property includes
only that property in which the tribe as an entity, as opposed to its individual
members, retains an interest.129 Tribal property is defined as that which is
owned by the tribe and is not an individual right.13 0 It is a right to use but not
transfer the property, based on membership in the specific tribe.'' If state
courts continue to interpret "tribal property" through the same narrow lens that
the courts currently use, tribal property will receive little judicial protection,
and the protections implemented by Congress to secure tribal property upon
divorce will remain ineffective.
Property generated by the tribe (such as revenue from gaming or other
economic ventures) that it chooses to distribute to its members is not

because they were deemed "income and therefore [] marital property subject to division upon
dissolution." Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360,370 (2006). In Wisconsin, a court determined
that improvements made on tribal property were personal property and thus subject to division
by a state court. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 405 N.W.2d 668, 669 (1987).
125. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.

126. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).
127. Washington has considered the value of trust property when dividing the property of
the parties in divorce. Landauer v. Landauer, 975 P.2d 577, 584 (1999).
128. 25 U.S.C. § 181 (2006).
129. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 966.
130. 42 C.J.S. Indians § 36 (2010).
131. Id.
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necessarily protected under the current definition of "tribal property."l3
Moreover, property previously allotted to a tribal member and now held in fee
simple is not fully protected under 25 U.S.C. § 181 because it does not fall
under the common definition of "tribal property," and the statute provides no
definition of its own.1 13 Under the canons of construction, courts must read
statutes and treaties dealing with Indians in the light most favorable to the
Indians and in the way the Indians themselves would have interpreted them.'34
Doubts or ambiguities in the language of the treaties and statutes affecting
Indians "are to be resolved in favor of' the Indians."' Accordingly, such a
narrow reading of "tribal property" is in direct conflict with one of the most
basic precepts of federal Indian law.
Congress also provides no definition in 25 U.S.C. § 181 for what exactly
are the "privileges" and "interests" that the members of the tribes receive on
account of their tribal membership, but that their spouses may not acquire.136
If read in light of the canons of construction and interpreted as the Indians
would have interpreted it at the time it was written,137 "privileges" and
"interests" would probably mean anything received on account of tribal
membership. Congress definitively should provide examples of what qualifies
as "tribal property." It should include all the privileges that attend tribal
membership, and should preclude their non-Indian spouses from acquiring
rights therein upon divorce.
Public Law 280 states that state courts do not have the authority to
"authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal
property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe"
when the property at issue is subject to restrictions by the federal
govemment."' The statute also prohibits states from adjudicating "the
ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein ... in
probate proceedings or otherwise." 39 It is clear from the language of this
statute that Congress intended states to have no authority over trust lands. The
language obstructing the states from determining "any interest therein"'4 0

132. COHEN, supra note 1, at 966.
133. See supranotes 128-29 and accompanying text; 25 U.S.C. § 181.
134. David M. Blurton, Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis, and Dependent Indian
Communities: A Test ofJudicialIntegrity, 16 ALASKA L. REv. 37, 42-43 (1999).
135. Id. at 42.
136. 25 U.S.C. § 181.
137. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2006).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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implies that the federal government intended to prevent the states from even
considering Indian trust property. If the state considers the value of the tribal
property in determining an equitable distribution, that consideration alone
could be perceived as distributing tribal property.
Though indirect, considering and determining the value of tribal property
could cause courts to offset that value by giving the other spouse
substitutionary property. Such an action does not directly grant an interest in
the tribal property, but perhaps affords the non-Indian spouse the equivalent
value. At bottom, the tribal member is in economically the same position as
if the court had affirmatively distributed the tribal property. If courts always
consider the value of the property and subsequently offset that property, it
could leave the "owner" of the tribal property in a much more dire financial
situation than the non-Indian ex-spouse. The tribal member is unable to sell
his or her tribal property to fulfill a court's demand to offset the tribal property
with other assets. Where the tribal property is the tribal member's only asset,
how might he or she compensate the non-Indian ex-spouse if the tribal
property is considered in equitable distribution? Moreover, funds necessary
for the upkeep of the tribal property may be granted to the non-Indian spouse
as offsetting assets, rendering proper maintenance impracticable. Whenever
courts consider the value of trust property or property with restrictions on
alienation, they should be especially cognizant to take all such restrictions into
consideration, thus noting that the tribal lands are worth significantly less than
similar parcels with no restrictions.'4 1
Courts do not always apply the canons of construction to treaties and
statutes affecting Native Americans, but they are especially useful with older
statutes and treaties.' 42 Treaties and statutes are to be interpreted liberally in
favor of the Indians due to past unequal bargaining power between the United
States and the tribes, and because Indians may not then have fully appreciated
the implications of the government's actions.' 43 The statutes governing the
distribution of tribal property in divorce were written in the nineteenth
century.'" Despite the mandates of the canons of construction, state courts do
not read 25 U.S.C. § 181 in the light most favorable to the Indians. If they did,
the courts' definition of "tribal property" would be more broad and inclusive.
The statute was originally written to keep "white men" from marrying "Indian

141. Landauer v. Landauer, 975 P.2d 577, 583-84 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
142. See generally Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237
(1985) (using canons of construction to interpret the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924).
143. See CANBY, JR., supra note 20, at 122.
144. 25 U.S.C. §§ 181-182 (2006) (codified in 1888).
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women" solely for their property.'45 Yet, because state courts narrowly read
the words "tribal property," and because of the statute's race-based limitations,
it is a very real possibility that what Congress endeavored to prevent in the late
1800s occurs today in a different form and is overlooked by the courts. Also,
the statute referring to "white men" marrying "Indian women" does not
confine itself to "tribal property," but also discusses "privileges" that
accompany tribal membership'46 - language either ignored or severely
misinterpreted by the courts today.
If the statutes are interpreted as the Indians would have understood them at
the time they were written, one would suppose that the Indians probably would
have understood "privileges" to mean anything afforded to the tribal member
on account of his or her tribal membership. Some tribes distribute significant
amounts of revenue from casinos and other enterprises to their members per
capita.1' If state courts take those distributions from the tribe and declare
them non-tribal property and thus income subject to distribution, the nonIndian spouse might receive a value equivalent to half of the distributions
received during the time the parties were married,'4 8 in addition to possibly
receiving the value of half of any actual income accrued thereon.149 It is highly
unlikely that Congress envisioned Native American casinos when writing the
statute protecting the property rights of Indian women, but it similarly seems
improbable that it intended money from the tribe to end up in the hands of a
non-Indian due to a divorce proceeding conducted in state court.
Moreover, by narrowly reading the statute only to protect "tribal property,"
courts disregard the subsequent language in the statute that mandates that the
"white man" not "acquire any right[,] ... privilege, or interest [] to whiclt any
member of such tribe is entitled."5 o Read in a light favorable to the Indians
- or even in light of the plain meaning of the text - the modem courts'
interpretation and application of the divorce statutes is erroneous. Property
held by an individual tribal member, such as money received from the tribe
from per-capita distributions, is a privilege to which members of the tribe are

145. See id. § 181.
146. Id.
147. Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that the tribe
distributed $84,000 monthly to the members of the tribe from the revenue of the gambling
institutions).
148. Courts have wide discretion to make distributions that they think are equitable. See
supraPart II.C.
149. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.

150. 25 U.S.C. § 181.
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entitled. 5 ' Allowing courts to reclassify those distributions merely as income
of the individual and thus to distribute the funds at divorce goes against the
language of the statute by granting a non-Indian privileges associated with
tribal membership. Not only are per-capita distributions from the tribe a
privilege of membership, but it is usually left to the tribal government, within
certain federal parameters,15 2 to determine how and whether to distribute the
profits among its members."' If the funds come directly from the tribe and the
tribe is the authority that determines the distribution of the funds, it follows
that the tribe has an interest in the property, even if no longer a monetary one.
Current distributions to tribal members usually are not subject to any type
of restriction once in the individual's possession.'54 The lack of federal or
tribal regulation of the funds after receipt does not negate the interest of the
tribe or even the federal government. The governments have an interest in
ensuring that the funds are not subsequently acquired in a wrongful manner by
a non-Indian simply because he was fortunate enough to marry an Indian
receiving tribal distributions in the form of funds that the state courts will
erroneously call income.
Tribes have an interest in the financial stability of their members, as well as
in their members' ability to contribute to the community and to society. When
the money the tribe distributes to its members easily is acquired in divorce, it
circumvents the interest of the tribe in allocating money or property to its
members on a per-capita basis. For example, within certain parameters, the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act allows the tribes to determine their own
methods for the use and distribution of the funds to tribal members.'s If tribes
contemplated that half of the per-capita gaming distributions for the length of
a marriage could be allocated to a non-Indian, it follows that the tribes
logically would place more up-front restrictions on the distributions made to
their members.
Moreover, there is a statute that prohibits outside creditors from foreclosing
upon the money that a tribal member receives "from the sale or lease of
allotments."' 6 It seems counterintuitive that Congress would go to such

151. See Zander,720 N.W.2d at 369; Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, If You BuildIt, They Will
Come: PreservingTribalSovereignty in the FaceofIndian Casinos and the New Premium on
TribalMembership, 14 LEWIS & CLARKL. REv. 311, 324, 326 (2010).
152. COHEN, supra note 1, at 1058 n.225 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006); 25 C.F.R. §§
522.4(b), 522.6(b) (2011)).
153. Id. at 1058.
154. Id.
155. Painter-Thorne, supra note 151, at 326.
156. COHEN, supra note 1, at 1060 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 410 (2006)).
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lengths to prevent creditors from reaching money from the sale of allotments,
but would be amenable to non-Indian ex-spouses acquiring money from
distributions or a portion of the proceeds from the sale or lease of tribal
property.
Congress passed several statutes dealing with protection of Native
American property. 57 The statutes may not all protect the same types of
property,'18 but it is apparent that there is a general desire for the preservation
of tribal property. There is a definite limit on states' ability to determine
ownership of tribal property with restrictions on alienation,'" but that by no
means implies that only trust property subject to explicit federal restrictions is
to be protected.
To ensure that its intent to protect tribal property is effectuated, Congress
should define tribal property in the context of marriage and divorce
proceedings involving tribal members to include more property than just that
subject to federal restrictions or in which the tribe has an interest. Tribal
property, especially in the context of dissolution of marriage, should include
per-capita distributions. The definition of tribal property should encompass
real property owned in fee simple by tribal members that originally was held
in trust, or property that was purchased in whole or in part with funds from the
tribe.
To fully protect the property of Native Americans from being acquired or
divided in divorce, Congress must not only rewrite the statute addressing
marriage to a tribal member, but also must include a comprehensive definition
of "tribal property," the ownership of which may not then be adjudicated by
state courts. In expanding the definition of "tribal property," Congress must
make explicit that tribal property does not encompass any property owned by
any tribal member to avoid being overinclusive. Instead, "tribal property"
must be related to the tribe in some way, whether by its location on the
reservation, former status as trust land, or the origination of funds with which
the property was purchased. Expanding the definition of "tribal property" to
include "privileges" and "interests" of membership should help courts to
consider the purpose behind the statutes - protecting the privileges and
interests that attend tribal membership.

157. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 181-182, 194 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006).
158. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 181 ("[A]ny right to any tribal property, privilege, or interest
whatever to which any member of such tribe is entitled."), with 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) ("[H]eld
in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United
States.").
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b).
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B. Treatment ofPropertyfrom a Tribe Within a Divorce
The first section of Public Law 280 in effect provides that state courts do
not have jurisdiction over certain tribal civil matters unless the state in
question has assumed jurisdiction under the statute.160 But the federal statutory
language has not prevented some state courts from determining that nonIndians have certain monetary interests in tribal property, and subsequently
awarding those non-Indian ex-spouses other property in lieu of the tribal
property.' 6 ' The absence of a statute directly addressing how state courts
should treat tribal property division in divorce creates confusion that causes
the various courts to adopt inconsistent approaches.1 62 The disagreement
among state courts on how to adjudicate tribal property matters is in need of
resolution, preferably through a federal statute that addresses the panoply of
potential problems that state courts face in tribal property division upon
divorce. Ideally, problems involving trust property should be resolved by
tribal courts (where they exist), promoting uniformity among the property
rights of the specific tribes.
The lack of statutory authority explicitly restricting jurisdiction over tribal
property not held in trust or subject to federal restrictions allows state courts
to determine tribal property matters in divorces involving other tribal
resources. Accordingly, the determination of whether per-capita distributions
to tribal members constitute marital income,' 63 rather than simply dividends
from separate property, may at first blush seem within the courts' legal
parameters. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) does not remove jurisdiction from
state courts for tribal property not classified as trust or restricted property, 25
U.S.C. § 181 restricts a "white man" from "acquir[ing] any right to any tribal
property, privilege, or interest whatever to which any member of such tribe is
entitled."'" Viewing the statutes together with an emphasis on the "privilege"
language of 25 U.S.C. § 181, state courts should not be able to make even the
small determination that tribal distribution funds may be offset or split with the
non-Indian spouse in a divorce action. The statutes read together suggest that
Congress intended tribal property to stay with tribal members, and that those

160. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).
161. E.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 656 P.2d 129, 132 (Idaho 1982); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 405 N.W.2d
668, 669 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
162. See Part III.B.
163. Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).

164. 25 U.S.C. § 181.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011

684

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

marrying into a tribal family should not thereupon be able to take the tribe's
property.
If the federal government is interested in protecting tribal property,
Congress should write a new, comprehensive statute to govern tribal property
division upon divorce. A new statute would solve the problems that attend the
uncertain parameters of state courts in dividing property where one party is a
tribal member in possession of tribal property. The prevalence of divorce in
today's society heightens the need for a more felicitous statute to protect the
tribal property rights of tribal members divorcing in state courts.
The new statute for tribal property division should include the more
inclusive language of 25 U.S.C. § 181 that bars a non-Indian from "acquir[ing]
any right to any tribal property, privilege, or interest whatever to which any
member of such tribe is entitled."' Congress should use this language instead
of the more restrictive language in 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b), which states that state
courts lack jurisdiction to determine "the ownership or right to possession of
such property or any interest therein."' 6 The less inclusive language of 28
U.S.C. § 1360(b) may create a diminished ability to protect tribal property not
held in trust or subject to restrictions. The more inclusive language of 25
U.S.C. § 181 is more likely to protect interests in tribal personal property that
perhaps are more prevalent today with the increase in tribal-owned businesses.
1. Classificationof Propertyfor a DivorceProceeding
Tribal property, such as per-capita distributions, is given to tribal members
because of a birthright/membership right. The members receive the property
because they pass the membership requirements of the respective tribe,' and
not because of the effort put forth by one of the spouses during the marriage.'
Accordingly, it makes sense that the government and the tribes would seek to
protect the tribal property of tribal members in divorce proceedings. It is
possible that a non-Indian could marry a tribal member in hopes of acquiring
some interest in tribal property. The cases may be rare, but one reported

165. Id.

166. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b).
167. See Painter-Thome, supra note 151, at 318-19, 324, 326.
168. "Equitable distribution classifies as marital any property produced by the efforts of
either of the marital partners." Deborah H. Bell, EquitableDistribution: Implementing the
MaritalPartnershipTheory Through the Dual ClassificationSystem, 67 Miss. L.J. 115, 150
(1997). Because no marital effort is involved in per-capita distributions, they should be
classified as separate property, and thus not subject to distribution.
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divorce case involving an Indian and a non-Indian included monthly per-capita
payments from the tribe of $84,000.169
During marriage, if the tribal member spouse wants to share her tribal
property with her non-Indian spouse, she may do so, 7 e but such sharing does
not give her ex-spouse an interest in the property. With the potential for such
large per-capita distributions, one easily could imagine a situation where a
non-Indian marries a tribal member to take advantage of her monthly
distributions. Later, when the non-Indian tires of the marriage, he files for
divorce in state court to avoid the application of any tribal laws that may
prevent him from receiving one-half of the distributions received by the Indian
spouse over the course of the marriage.
Courts should treat tribal property similar to separate property in an
ordinary divorce action. Property acquired solely by one spouse is separate
property. The acquisition may have occurred prior to marriage, but could also
include property attained through gift or inheritance during the marriage."'
Trust property, the most protected of the types of Indian property, generally
descends from one member of the family to others,' 72 and is therefore akin to
"separate" inheritance.
Jurisdictions differ in the precise treatment of different property in
dissolution-of-marriage cases. The jurisdiction could be an all-property or a
dual-classification jurisdiction. 7 3 In an all-property jurisdiction, courts have
authority over all property, regardless of when it was acquired, but nonetheless
considering the source of the property and the date acquired.'74 In a dualclassification jurisdiction, the court classifies the property as either marital or
separate before determining how to divide the assets in the divorce."' Courts
should clearly treat tribal property (per-capita payments, tribal leases, trust
property, etc.) exclusively as separate property. Tribal property is analogous
to separate property because it reaches the member through means similar to
an inheritance or gift - the same ways in which separate property can be
acquired."'
Interest/income earned due to an increase in the value of separate property
is also separate property, even if the interest/income is earned over the course

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
See Painter-Thorne, supra note 151, at 317.
TURNER, supra note 57, § 8:7.
See Landauer v. Landauer, 975 P.2d 577, 579 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
TURNER, supra note 57, § 8:7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of the marriage."' The parties may commingle the property to such a degree
that the separate property can no longer be traced back to its original source
and must therefore be classified as marital property.17 s Per-capita payments
from the tribe's business revenue are similar to interest/income because the
payments flow from property held before the marriage (through
birthright/tribal membership). Accordingly, the per-capita distributions should
not be treated as marital income subject to division by the courts, unless there
appears to be a deliberate commingling, the burden of proof for which should
rest on the non-Indian ex-spouse. The presumption by some courts that all
property of the spouses is marital unless otherwise provenl79 should not apply
to Indians divorcing in state court because the presumption may cause undue
hardship on the Indian, who must then trace the property to prove its separate
quality.
Courts should perhaps take it one step further than they do with separate
property and not even consider the value of the tribal property in determining
an equitable distribution. Congress has shown a strong interest in protecting
the property of Native Americans,' and that interest would be better protected
if the property were simply disregarded by the courts in the dissolution of
marriage. If the state courts are allowed to consider tribal property when
making an equitable distribution of assets, their unfamiliarity with valuing
tribal assets could cause them to inflate the distribution to the non-Indian, not
to mention that such consideration ignores the source of the property as
functionally "separate." Congress should clearly specify that property coming
from a tribe is separate property not to be considered in equitable distribution.
State court judges with little to no experience dealing with tribal property then
will make consistent and straightforward determinations on account of clearly
defined guidelines.
All courts consider the origin of the property in divorce cases because of the
notion that marriage is an economic partnership, and property acquired during
the marriage thus should be divided fairly between the former spouses.'
Courts also recognize, however, that "[t]he policy behind equitable distribution
does not support sharing of property acquired outside the marriage."' 82
Classifying property as "separate" in a traditional divorce allows for an

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

AM. JUR. ProofofFacts3d 705 § 14 (1993).
Id. § 14.5.
Id. § 13.
See generally25 U.S.C. §§ 181-82, 194 (2006).
TURNER, supra note 57, § 8:7.
Id.
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unequal but perhaps more equitable distribution of property. This is because
the court does not "count" the separate property, and the marital estate is
divided without regard to that property.183 Expressly classifying tribal property
as separate and creating an affirmative duty for the courts to disregard its
acquisition time would put it in a category all its own, making judges less
likely to confuse the interest (or lack thereof) of the non-Indian in that property
when dissolving the marriage. Jurisdictions frequently allow unequal property
distributions when it includes property procured by one party prior to the
inception of the marriage.'" Moreover, courts often give unequal property to
spouses in a divorce action where the separate property includes a gift or
inheritance to one of the spouses.18 s Because property afforded to tribal
members on account of their membership is analogous to separate property,
the courts should disregard such property when fashioning an equitable
distribution in divorce.
2. Income

Congress should clarify that tribal property, such as per-capita payments,
is not income of the tribal member spouse because there is no marital effort
expended in relation to the payments.18' Marital property includes income
If the
from the labor of either spouse earned during the marriage.'87
thus
the
payments
spouse,
of
the
appreciation in value results from the effort
Alternatively, states may classify
could be considered marital income.'
property as separate if it appreciates in value during the pendency of the
marriage where neither spouse expends effort to stimulate the appreciation in
Per-capita payments from the tribes involve no marital effort and
value.'
therefore should be classified as separate property. They are analogous to gifts
or inheritances (which themselves are classified as "separate") because tribal
members receive them due to a birthright or membership status rather than
through effort. Per-capita payments are akin to dividends from stock or
interest from a trust, subject to the market and external factors for calculation

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Contra I.R.C. § 61 (2006) (listing, for tax purposes, the computation of gross income
to include royalties, dividends, interest, and income from trusts, among others).
187. Shari Motro, Labor,Luck, andLove: Reconsideringthe Sanctity ofSeparateProperty,
102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1623, 1631 (2008).
188. UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 14(b), 9A U.L.A. 141 (1983).
189. See id.
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of the amount received: they are not subject in any way to actions of the
spouses. 9 0
Payments from tribes to members because of tribal business revenues
should fall under the language of 25 U.S.C. § 181 as an interest in tribal
property. Accordingly, the courts should determine that non-Indian spouses
are unable to acquire any interest in that property. In some ways, a non-Indian
still may actually have more property protections than state courts are allowing
tribal members for their per-capita distributions. An ordinary couple divorcing
in state court need not, in most cases, sacrifice their separate property, such as
royalties or dividends from interests owned prior to the marriage, to the other
party in the divorce.' 9 ' Some state courts, on the other hand, force tribal
members to give their non-Indian ex-spouses half of their per-capita
distributions received by the tribal member over the course of the marriage,' 92
despite that the distributions began before the marriage and are an incident of
tribal membership. To ensure that Indians are not placed at a comparative
disadvantage, Congress should clarify that per-capita distributions are separate
property, even if received by the party during the pendency of the marriage,
and should be entirely disregarded by the courts in property division.
3. Trust Property
One state supreme court found 25 U.S.C. § 181 inapplicable to trust
property because it is not, technically speaking, "tribal property," as it belongs
to an individual in trust, rather than to the tribe.' Not only does this holding
blatantly mischaracterize the nature of trust land, but it also removes from the
definition of "tribal property" the very type of property that one would most
intuitively believe to qualify as such. Such judicial flagrancy could be avoided
with more explicit statutory provisions, and Congress should be clear that trust
property is tribal property.
Courts should apply 25 U.S.C. § 181 to individual trust property, despite
that state courts currently may not always apply the statute. The Native

190. Some states treat appreciation in value of separate property as non-marital property,
even if the increase in value occurs during the pendency ofthe marriage. This applies to several
different types of property, including stocks, because the increase in value is not attributable to
the effort of the spouses. Emily Osborn, Comment, The Treatment of Unearned Separate
Propertyat Divorce in Common Law PropertyJurisdictions,1990 Wis. L. REV. 903, 929.
191. Id § 4(g), 9A U.L.A. 116-17.
192. Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
193. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 904-05 (Idaho 1982). The same court then
determined that property purchased with tribal funds is not tribal property, and thus falls under
the jurisdiction of the state court for purposes of property distribution upon divorce. Id. at 905.
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American, because of his tribal status, holds trust property,1 94 and his tribe has
an affirmative interest therein. Trust land is a privilege "to which any member
of such tribe is entitled,"l95 and state courts should recognize that privilege as
an interest falling under the protection of 25 U.S.C. § 181.
If, in the case of property purchased with tribal funds but not held in trust,
the couple is able to compensate the tribe for its contribution with marital
assets, the tribe presumably would no longer retain an interest in the property.
Alternatively, if the property is bought with tribal funds and the tribe is not
reimbursed, the state court should leave any adjudication of the rights of that
property to the tribal court because the tribe clearly retains an interest in any
property in which it has invested its funds.
a) Trust Property- Investments by Non-Indian Spouses
Non-tribal property owned by Indians can be converted into trust property
with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior."' The land-into-trust statute
allows the Secretary, "in his discretion, to acquire, through purchase,
relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands."' 97 Once
these lands are acquired, title vests in the federal government as trustee, with
the tribes or their members retaining beneficial enjoyment.'"
A variety of factors may compel a tribal member to request that his or her
private land be placed into trust, but the most commonsense reasons include
ensuring that the land stays with the tribe through successive generations, as
well as the obvious economic benefits that flow from the tax-exempt status of
trust lands.'99 Once an individual tribal member's lands are placed into trust,
the lands become subject to all of the restrictions that attend trust status,
including inalienability.200
Under a theory akin to assumption of the risk, a non-tribal spouse who
consents to have marital property placed into trust should be unable to claim
an interest in the lands upon divorce. The decision to place land into trust
necessitates that the parties weigh the relative risks and benefits, making the
decision to do so a considered one, which should effectively prevent the nontribal spouse from legitimately claiming that he was unaware that his
individual interest would be swallowed by the tribal interest.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See COHEN, supra note 1, at 1068.

25 U.S.C. § 181 (2006).
25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006).
Id.
Id.

199. See id. ("[Siuch lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local taxation.").
200. See id.
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Where the land is purchased primarily- or even entirely - with the funds
of the non-tribal spouse, it is presumably more difficult for ajudge to disregard
the interest of the non-tribal spouse in the tribal land because part of the
property was purchased either from the tribe or the government with non-tribal
funds. The language of the divorce statute, however, is clear that a non-Indian
cannot acquire an interest in that tribal property,201 which indicates that even
if the funds derive from the non-tribal spouse, he should retain no interest.
A spouse using separate or marital funds to purchase Indian trust property
with restrictions on alienation should be aware of that fact. If the non-tribal
spouse voluntarily invests his money into tribal property that he knows he
cannot "own" because of government restrictions, why should he, upon
divorce, be able to claim an interest and receive part of its value? Moreover,
the burden of proof in such an instance falls upon the non-Indian claiming an
interest because of statutory protections put in place by Congress for the
benefit of the Indians.20 2 If the non-Indian truly believed he owned a piece of
the tribal property, his only means of recovery should be through the Secretary
of Interior, who must approve all transfers of trust property.203 The state courts
should be afforded no discretion to adjudicate rights in trust property.
b) Improvements Made to TribalLand
Courts could apply the same theory to improvements made on tribal
property as mentioned above for investments in tribal land. Improvements to
tribal land include a variety of things, such as building a barn or a house that
increases the value of the tribal land. Immovable improvements to the land are
as much a part of the land as the soil upon which they rest.2" State courts thus
do not have the right to adjudicate the interests in those improvements because
they are part of the property. 205 Along with improvements to the property, the
non-Indian also may have made improvements to the land through effort,
making it more valuable. Any types of improvements due to non-Indian
spouses create difficulties for courts trying to divide marital estates in a
divorce. Courts have handled improvements inconsistently, evidencing the
need for clear guidance from Congress.206
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2006).
202. See 25 U.S.C. § 194 (2006).
203. 25 U.S.C. § 392 (2006).
204. See L. S. Tellier, Sprinkler System as Fixture, 19 A.L.R.2d 1300, at *1.

205. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b).
206. E.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 656 P.2d 129, 132 (Idaho 1982) (allowing reimbursement to
nonmember spouse for what would have been his equitable interest in the property or
improvements made thereto in lieu of an actual interest in the property, which would not be
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Improvements made upon the land by a non-Indian with no right, privilege,
or interest in the property could be treated the same as improvements made to
lease property. If the courts consider the interest of the non-Indian as a
leasehold interest, one can argue that they have no interest in the
improvements at all. In leased property, where the tenant voluntarily makes
improvements to the land and there is no specific agreement between the
parties that the landlord must reimburse the tenant, the tenant forfeits the value
of the improvements.207 In cases where a non-Indian spouse makes
improvements to tribal property, the improvements presumably are made with
the knowledge that the land does not belong to him, and any improvements
thus would be left behind absent a prior arrangement. The tribal member
spouse is similar to the landlord. Any voluntary improvements made by her
non-Indian spouse would be akin to improvements made by a tenant on leased
property, and thus not subject to reimbursement by the courts.
Courts should be able to exercise discretion when making equitable
distributions of property in divorce, even when one party is a tribal member
in possession of tribal property. Because divorces between Indians and nonIndians regularly take place in state court, the judges should be able to use
principles with which they are familiar when making determinations. Where
the courts ordinarily do so, they should consider the marital efforts of each
spouse during the pendency of the marriage, as well as the respective and
relevant needs, to make a fair distribution of the marital estate. But anytime
Indian property arises within the context of the case, the judges should
exercise the utmost care to ensure that they do not exceed the bounds of their
authority.208 Courts should also be cognizant that property a tribal member
spouse receives from the tribe is akin to an inheritance or a gift, and thus
should be classified as separate in states that recognize separate property.
Tribal leases, trust property, per-capita payments, and any other property
received by the tribal member from the tribe should be handled by the courts
with caution to ensure the interests are not mischaracterized to the detriment
of the tribal member.

allowed under state court jurisdiction); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 405 N.W. 2d 668, 669 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987) (allowing a home and improvements made thereon to be subject to property division upon
divorce, despite that tribal permission was needed to remove the improvement).
207. 52A C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 870 (2010).
208. See, e.g., Landauer v. Landauer, 975 P.2d 577, 579 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
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C. Gender and Race
Giving 25 U.S.C. § 181 its literal meaning would mean that only "white
men" marrying "Indian women" are restricted from acquiring any interest in
tribal property and privileges. 209 No statute exists with the inverse rule,
restricting white (or any non-tribal) women from receiving some interest or
right to any tribal property held or owned by their tribal husbands. The literal
meaning of the statute, with its identification of a certain race and gender that
cannot take under the statute, could cause a plethora of problems. Indians, at
the time the statutes were written, probably would have read the "white man"
language simply to mean a person that was not a member of their tribe.
To protect the property rights of tribal members, Congress should replace
25 U.S.C. § 181 with a more modem statute that reflects the contemporary
needs of Native Americans and their spouses during divorce. Of the relevant
statutes, 25 U.S.C. § 181 most closely relates to dissolution-of-marriage cases
by directly addressing a non-Indian marrying an Indian. Congress should
rewrite the statute, however, to eliminate the language that limits its scope to
the "white man." Native Americans, like all races, presumably could
intermarry among any race or nationality. Naming the "white man" gives the
statute less perceived force in protecting property because it is
incomprehensive and underinclusive. Someone reading the statute today may
erroneously assume that it no longer applies because of its antiquated and
narrow wording. Similarly, courts considering the statute may ignore its spirit
in any case where the parties are not a "white man" and an "Indian woman,"
despite that its underlying principles remain exceptionally relevant.
Moreover, the statute should be rewritten to eliminate the gender bias.
Currently, the statute restricts the "white man" from acquiring the property of
the "Indian woman" after their marriage, but fails to contemplate a non-Indian
woman marrying an Indian man.2 10 Women in today's culture hold property
on equal footing with men, and the statute therefore should reflect this gender
equality by similarly protecting the tribal property rights of male tribal
members.
Another statute in need of revision is 25 U.S.C. § 194, which places the
burden of proof on the "white person" in property disputes. 2 11 A new statute
for tribal property disputes should reflect the policy behind 25 U.S.C. § 194
- that Congress wished to protect tribal property from acquisition by non-

209. 25 U.S.C. § 181 (2006).
210. Id.
211. 25 U.S.C.§ 194.
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Indians. The new statute should clarify that it is not limited by race or gender,
encompassing all modem possibilities for tribal marriage and divorce.
D. ProposedStatute
Considering all of the problems discussed above, the following is a humble
attempt to draft a comprehensive statute to govern tribal property distribution
upon divorce.
Dissolution of Marriage Between Tribal Member and Non-Indian or
Nonmember
(a) In a dissolution of marriage involving a tribal member, state courts do
not have the authority or jurisdiction to adjudicate any rights, interests, or
privileges in any tribal property.
(b) The state courts may not consider the value of tribal property for
purposes of equitable distribution.
(c) Within the meaning of this section, tribal property includes any right that
flows from membership in the tribe, including but not limited to: trust land
and improvements made thereon, per-capita distributions and property
purchased therefrom, and tribal leases and income derived therefrom.
V Conclusion
In divorces involving a tribal member, difficulties arise where state courts
may grant a divorce, but may not fully distribute the property between the
parties. In that circumstance, another court must adjudicate the rights of the
parties in conjunction with any tribal property. State courts, however, may be
unsympathetic to tribal members with large holdings acquired during the
pendency of the marriage who do not wish to share that wealth with the nonIndian spouse.
Several other difficulties may arise in cases involving tribal members and
their property, including how to classify property, income, and improvements.
To protect the rights of the Indians, Congress specifically should address these
issues to simplify any future disputes over the law in the area of property
division in divorce among couples with tribal property. If Congress does not
provide guidance to state courts dividing the property of tribal members, state
courts will continue to assume unauthorized jurisdiction, and will erroneously
divide property received by the tribal member exclusively from tribal sources.
Congress should write a new statute to govern tribal property division upon
divorce. The statute should clearly delineate the property that Congress
intends to protect so that the state courts are not left to determine what
qualifies as "tribal property." Tribal property should encompass real and
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personal property received by tribal members based on membership status.
Courts should be extremely careful when considering improvements and
investments made to tribal property with marital funds, remembering that
restricted property generally is less valuable. Congress should also ensure that
the new statute applies equally, regardless of race and gender.
The multiple statutes that apply to protecting tribal property demonstrate
that Congress is concerned with the issue. With modern-day marriages
dissolving at unprecedented rates, Congress must ensure that its statutes
protect tribal property in the event of divorce. To afford comprehensive
protection, Congress must update its statutes.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol35/iss2/7

